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Abstract
We argue that job performance appraisal is an agency problem with asymmetric
transfer values: an employee is paid in proportion to the rating received from
his line manager, who only partially internalizes the resultant payroll cost. This
asymmetry in rating valuations is based on evidence that managers are not fully
accountable for payroll expense, with the degree of unaccountability increasing in
rm size. We develop a nested agency model of economic organization of a rm with
unaccountable managers, which in equilibrium obtains the rm-size wage e¤ects
the large-rm wage premium and inverse relationship between rm size and wage
dispersion.
JEL codes: J30, D21, M52.
1 Introduction
Empirical studies on payroll expense unequivocally show that rm size matters for em-
ployee wages: large rms pay more on average, but at the same time there is more varia-
tion in wages in small rms, everything else equal (Brown & Medo¤ (1989); Oi & Idson
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(1999); Troske (1999)). This evidence suggests that incentives for employees in place can
di¤er across small and large rms. The still open question is what factors variable across
rms of di¤erent size can be attributed to the incidence of these rm-size wage e¤ects. In
this paper, we explore one dimension, in which rms of di¤erent size do di¤er namely,
managerial accountability for payroll expense that can lead to di¤erences in employee
incentive schemes, producing the rm-size wage e¤ects in question. When studying the
link between managerial accountability and employee wage schedules, we also address the
phenomenon of the compression of job performance appraisal ratings from organizational
psychology literature (see, e.g., Murphy & Cleveland (1995) or Prendergast (1999) for an
economist perspective), which we relate and jointly explain together with the regularities
of rm-size wage e¤ects.
Literature on organizational psychology provides evidence about managers not held
fully accountable for payroll expense incurred and that they do use discretion over their
subordinatespay to their own advantage (see Longenecker et al. (1987)). Furthermore,
there is also evidence that managersbudget-related behavior, including the degree of
discretion over subordinatespay, depends on the organizational structure of the rm,
with rm size among its main characteristics. In particular, in small rms managers
are found to work under tighter and narrowly-dened nancial control systems, whereas
in large rms managers tend to have more control and discretion over the budgetary
matters they are in charge of (Bruns &Waterhouse (1975)). In this paper, we study what
implications for employee wage schedules a varying degree of managerial accountability
can have. More specically, with the link between rm size and the degree of managerial
accountability in mind, we study the question if di¤erences in managerial accountability
across small and large rms can be behind the rm-size wage e¤ects observed.
We address the question raised above through a three-tier agency model of the eco-
nomic organization of a rm. The size of a rm and its organizational structure are taken
as given (e.g., as determined by the production technology or as evolved over time).1
1There is a growing body of literature (see, e.g., Rosen (1982), Garicano & Rossi-Hansberg (2004),
Garicano & Rossi-Hansberg (2006), Fox (2009)) that models organizational structure, including rm size,
endogenously to information aggregation among agents with implications to employee ability sorting and
wage di¤erentials across rms. Since it is managerial accountability that lies at the focus of this paper,
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Similarly to Tirole (1986), we divide the vertical managerial structure of a rm into the
following tiers: i) the owner(s) of a rm (including other residual claimants such as top
executive management), ii) (low- and middle-ranking) managers, and iii) employees. The
interaction between the tiers is modeled as follows (more thoroughly discussed later). It
is only the employees who produce output. The managers supervise and evaluate the
performance of their employees, which the managers can perfectly observe and condition
their rewards performance appraisal ratings upon. The owner designs compensation
schemes for the managers, which depend on the output produced by their employees
in charge and the payroll expense incurred. The key assumption of the model is that,
unlike managers, the owner observes only imperfectly employeesperformance, including
their cost of production e¤ort.2 This asymmetry in information prevents the owner from
perfectly aligning managersincentives with the prot maximization of the rm. Based
on the empirical evidence quoted above (with more provided below), this assumption of
the model takes the form that managers do not internalize in full or, equivalently, can-
not be made fully accountable for the payroll expenses incurred when evaluating their
employeesperformance with the degree of managerial accountability decreasing in rm
size.
We argue that managerial (un-)accountability can be a cause of the rm-size wage
e¤ects: Incorporating a managers soft budget constraint into a nested two-stage agency
model with hidden information produces theoretical predictions that o¤er a good match
with the empirical stylized facts quoted. We show that the less accountable for payroll
expense a manager is, the more the employee e¤ort he aims to elicit in attempt to
maximize his own compensation. On the other hand, the less accountable a manager is,
the more the owner limits the managers payroll budget in attempt to prevent excessive
payroll expenses. Given the reciprocal relationship between managerial accountability
and rm size, we obtain that in larger rms there is less variation in employee wages
we, for the sake of tractability, take the structure of a rm as given. (The introduction of managerial un-
accountability, pertinent to large rms, into a model with endogenous organizational structure, arguably,
deserves a closer theoretical investigation.)
2 ...similarly to Axiom 1 of Tirole (1986, p. 183), which reads that the principal lacks either the time
or the knowledge required to supervise the agent.Later in the paper, we address this assumption more
specically.
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(due to managersoptimally compressing rewards because of budgetary limits imposed),
but at the same time the average wage paid can be higher than that paid in smaller
rms, respectively. Furthermore, we also obtain that in our model small rms are more
protable than large ones, which is consistent with empirical evidence on small rms
higher stock returns and, arguably, their higher protability, see Banz (1981) and Fama
& French (1992). (We use the latter evidence to distinguish our explanation of the rm-
size wage e¤ects from other alternative explanations.)
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the
existing practice(s) of employee and manager compensation and its main features, which
stand behind our modeling framework, and also related literature on the rm-size wage
e¤ects and compression of job performance appraisal ratings. In Section 3, we develop
and solve our nested agency model. In Section 4, we discuss the properties of the wage
schedules obtained in equilibrium, and in Section 5 we discuss our ndings in relationship
to the existing empirical evidence. The last section concludes the study.
2 Background and Motivation
At the cornerstone of this paper lies, in the words of Alchian & Demsetz (1972), metering
input productivity and metering rewards.Di¤erently from Alchian & Demsetz (1972),
however, in this paper we study the problem of metering employeesinputs and rewards
from the perspective of an owner-manager relationship rather than from the perspective
of a manager-employee relationship. The idea is that under the existing practice of
managerial compensation, described below, the interests of the owner and a manager
with respect to employee compensation may actually diverge.
The monitoring and appraisal of employeesindividual e¤ort levels are done by low-
and middle-ranking managers, who are neither residual claimants, nor their pay can be
perfectly aligned to the prot of the rm.3 Typically, as an alternative to prot-sharing
3According to surveys by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 1999 only 1.4 percent of US business
establishments granted stock options to their nonexecutive employees. It is suggested that the reason
for this is the limited incentive e¤ects associated with stock options, see Besanko et al. (2007, p.
499). Moreover, among those rms that do o¤er stock options to all their employees, an incentive-based
explanation for it is rejected, see Oyer & Schaefer (2005).
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rules, the owner of a rm o¤ers her managers a compensation scheme, which depends on
their accomplishing individual objectives (the so-called management by objectives) or on
their performance evaluation adjusted for the overall protability of the rm, see Bruns &
McKinnon (1992); Milkovich & Wigdor (1991). In addition, the owner sets up objectives
for managers to be achieved within certain constraints nancial control systems. In
companies that practice job performance appraisal systems these constraints also take
the form of employee performance appraisal standards on how to reward (and monitor)
the performance of employees, against which managers need to justify the ratings they
give. This is done in order to prevent managers from incurring great payroll expense when
maximizing their own compensation, which normally increases in employee performance.
But, as is suggested from the incidence of the compression of performance appraisal
ratings and other direct evidence of managerial (un-)accountability, discussed below, the
existing practice of managerial compensation seems to have ine¢ ciencies. With the aim
of rewarding managers for their accomplishments only, the owner of a rm may fail to
align perfectly managers incentives with the prot maximization of the rm. When
designing compensation schemes for managers, the owner draws on her own knowledge
about the workings of the managerial job its contribution to the prots of the rm
and its share of total costs which may nonetheless be less accurate than that possessed
by the managers. Consequently, this asymmetry in information allows better-informed
managers to bargain for compensation schemes more advantageous to themselves rather
than to the rm,4 which here we model in the form of managershaving leeway with
respect to the payroll expense they incur when evaluating employee performance.
2.1 Job Performance Appraisal and Compression of Ratings
According to surveys of business organizations (for a review, see Murphy & Cleveland
(1995, p. 4)), most public and private companies between 74% and 89% of those sur-
veyed in the US, with large companies somewhat more prevalent practice a formal job
performance appraisal system, done mainly for employee salary administration purposes.
4See Milkovich & Wigdor (1991) for more on managerial compensation practices and managers
bargaining advantages.
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The usual way job performance appraisals work is that a supervisor (manager) rates
various aspects of his or her employeesperformance on a pre-specied scale, and each
employee is then paid in accordance to the overall rating given by the supervisor. There-
fore, a rating issued by a manager is money equivalent for the receiver of the rating, i.e.,
the employee (but not necessarily so for its issuer, i.e., the manager with the company
paying the nal payroll bill).
The practice of performance appraisals, however, has fallen short of the expectations
about their utility. The distribution of ratings typically exhibits a shallow di¤erentiation
of good from bad performance, arguably, leading to weak work incentives and ine¢ cient
performance outcomes in the end. In the psychological literature, this has been labeled
the compression of ratingsphenomenon (for comprehensive reviews, see Landy & Farr
(1983) and Murphy & Cleveland (1995); for a case study, see Murphy (1992)). Economists
see this phenomenon as one of the causes of the dominance of xed wages in company
payrolls (Prendergast (1999)), and, accordingly, raise the question of why job performance
appraisal systems are ine¢ cient in creating stronger economic incentives for employees
(for a comprehensive discussion, see Bruns (1992)).
Industrial and organizational psychologists have traditionally viewed job performance
appraisal and its consequences the compression of ratings, in particular as a measure-
ment problem. They distinguish three most frequently encountered measurement biases:
the halo e¤ect, a tendency to rate the same on all dimensions, centrality bias, an
overreliance on the middle of the rating scale, and leniency bias,a tendency to give ex-
treme ratings (which is at the main focus of this paper). Psychologists found no evidence
that personal characteristics of raters or ratees have any explanatory power for the sys-
tematic patterns observed in performance appraisal, see Landy & Farr (1980). Instead,
psychologists have now come to think that performance appraisal cannot be adequately
understood outside its organizational context, which is a major determinant of a raters
goal-oriented rating behavior,see Murphy & Cleveland (1995).
In economic terms, job performance appraisal, if looked upon from the perspective
of ratersgoal-oriented rating behavior, can be interpreted as an agency problem with
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asymmetric transfer values. As already been mentioned, managers may nd ratings as
(partially) costless rewards and use these rewards in eliciting higher employee performance
levels, from which the managers directly benet. Hence, a job performance appraisal
makes an agency relationship between a manager and employees with the managers
having a soft budget constraint with regard to the evaluation of employee performance.
In literature on organizational psychology, there is empirical support for managers
having leeway in their conduct of performance appraisals. Longenecker et al. (1987) pro-
vide evidence, obtained from anonymously conducted interviews with 60 managers, that
shows that managers manipulate the whole appraisal process to their own advantage.
Mero & Motowidlo (1995) experimentally conrm the hypothesis that less accountable
managers tend to appraise their subordinates more leniently. Managersstrategic behav-
ior with respect to job performance appraisal is also discussed in Murphy & Cleveland
(1995), where they summarize evidence about managersmore di¤erentiating employee
performance when done for research purposes (e.g., for the allocation of job training
resources) than for salary administration purposes.
Furthermore, it has also been observed that employee performance appraisal standards
vary greatly across di¤erent organizations, and one of the factors behind those di¤erences
is organization size. Landy & Farr (1983, p. 104105) describe how many smaller organi-
zations hold supervisor conferences to evaluate and, accordingly, reward the performance
of each employee in turn, which is not feasible in large organizations. Murphy & Cleve-
land (1995, p. 355) see decentralization as a way to increase the e¢ ciency of performance
appraisal practice in organizations, because it would allow performance appraisal stan-
dards to be tailored more accurately for every functional unit. There is also experimental
evidence showing that the degree of task interdependence among group members inversely
a¤ects the di¤erentiation of good from bad performance, see Liden & Mitchell (1983). In
other words, in (large) organizations with less precise appraisal standards managers nd
themselves more able to justify a larger variety of rating distributions issued for the same
performance outcome, which in the end makes managers less accountable for the ratings
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they give.5
Regarding the related literature in economics, this paper, when it comes to explaining
the compression of ratings phenomenon, is most closely related to principal-agent models
with subjective evaluation as in, e.g., MacLeod (2003) and Levin (2003). The distinctive
feature of these models is that e¤ort levels are non-contractible and are rewarded accord-
ing to the principals subjective evaluation. Under the threat of a conict, the principal
may nd it futile to di¤erentiate rewards based solely on her subjective performance eval-
uations, when there is a great likelihood that the agent will think di¤erently of his own
performance. Unlike this strand of literature, the current paper allows for contractible
(by managers) employee e¤ort levels. Our results hinge on contractual incompleteness
between the owner and her managers stemming from asymmetric information about em-
ployee e¤ort levels and their costs. As we are going to see, in our model the compression
of ratings is the outcome of the optimal (manager-compensation-maximizing) incentive
scheme o¤ered by a manager to his employees.
2.2 Firm-Size Wage E¤ects
As already been mentioned in the introduction, two rm-size wage e¤ects are distin-
guished. The rst one is the large-rm wage premium: large rms pay on average higher
wages, ceteris paribus. The second is the inverse relationship between wage dispersion
and rm size.6 Signicantly, the same two e¤ects have been documented across di¤erent
countries and industries: It seems that rm size matters. A number of explanations have
been o¤ered, some of which are discussed below, but more research on this question seems
called for (see Brown & Medo¤ (1989) and Oi & Idson (1999) for reviews).
Regarding the large-rm wage premium, there is no consensus explanation for this
phenomenon: Troske (1999) tests seven most frequently encountered explanations with
the help of a comprehensive database just to show that there is still unexplained premium
paid to workers of large rms. Two explanations 1) ability sorting due to complemen-
5In the words of Bruns &Waterhouse (1975), the study cited in the introduction, in large organizations
managers tend to have more control and discretion over the budgetary matters.
6Recently, Fox (2009) has presented a new rm-size wage e¤ect: among white-collar employees the
large-rm wage premium increases with job responsibility.
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tarity between worker skill and physical capital (Hamermesh (1980), Idson & Oi (1999)),
2) di¤erential job screening policies due to monitoring costs rising in rm size (Bulow
& Summers (1986), Garen (1985)) have attracted more attention in the literature (see,
e.g., Ferrer & Lluis (2008)). Regarding the rst explanation (which also nds support
in the theoretical work of Rosen (1982), Garicano & Rossi-Hansberg (2004), Garicano
& Rossi-Hansberg (2006)), Idson & Oi (1999) argue that the shape of wage-size relation
depends on worker preferences, working conditions, and, most importantly, technology.
The idea is that large rms, exploiting their returns to scale, can invest in more produc-
tive labor tools. According to Idson & Oi (1999), the systematic di¤erences observed in
wage schedules can arise because in larger rms employees, being better equipped, are
more productive, as measured by output per hour, and, therefore, they command higher
wages.7 But this explanation fails to explain why there is a lower wage dispersion in
larger rms or why large rms are less protable (especially if they are argued to be more
productive), as the nancial empirical evidence indicates to be the case (Banz (1981);
Fama & French (1992)). In the current paper, we o¤er a di¤erent insight into the em-
pirical ndings of Idson & Oi (1999). We argue that in a larger rm employees exert on
average higher e¤ort levels (and get paid more) because of more lenient incentive schemes
set by their less accountable managers, which, on the other hand, may not be in the best
interest of the rm.
The second explanation, quoted above, is centered on the assumption that monitoring
costs increase in rm size. As, for instance, Garen (1985) and Evans & Leighton (1989)
show, despite paying on average lower wages, small rms reward their employeesabilities
and acquired skills, such as experience, at a greater rate than do large rms. Garen (1985)
develops a model based on the assumption that employeesmonitoring and evaluation
costs rise with rm size because of larger imperfections in acquiring information. He
provides empirical evidence supporting his models prediction that larger rms pay a
smaller return to measured ability, but have a larger intercept in their wage equations,
which also found support in Evans & Leighton (1989). The rst study to document
7See also Hamermesh (1980) for a related argument.
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an inverse relationship between wage dispersion and rm size is Stigler (1962). More
specically, Stigler (1962) attributes this rm-size wage e¤ect to the fact that the owner
of a small company can better judge the quality of her employees performance and,
therefore, can better design economic incentives for employees. (In our model, where
we assume no di¤erences in monitoring employee cost across rms, the same di¤erences
in pay schedules across rms arise from the fact that the owner of a smaller rm can
more accurately relate her managerspay to the prots of the rm, which in turn makes
managers di¤erentiate employee performance more than they would do in larger rms.)
3 Model
In this section, we develop a three-tier agency model of economic organization of a rm
based on the features of vertical managerial structure discussed above. The key element of
the model is the soft budget constraint that managers have with respect to the employee
payroll expense they incur. For the modeling framework, we draw on Tirole (1986), who
study the collusive behavior of managers and employees in a three-tier agency model.
3.1 Framework
Consider a prot-maximizing rm, owned by the owner. In the rm, production is split
among N production divisions. Every division consists of one employee and one manager,
and it produces an input to the nal product of the rm using only the employees labor
services. The division managers job is to induce the employee to exert e¤ort. The
manager does so through designing and implementing a pay-for-e¤ort incentive scheme.
(In line with the practice of job performance appraisal, the manager rewards the employee
with a rating, which translates into the employees monetary pay; therefore, we use ratings
and pay synonymously.) The owner, accordingly, is to design a compensation scheme for
the managers, rewarding them for their division outputs and penalizing for the payroll
expenses subject to the informational constraints described below. The assumption is
that the productional and organizational structures of the rm, including the number of
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divisions N , are exogenous.
Consider a representative division of the rm, which workings and contribution to the
prots of the rm are similar to those of other divisions. An e¤ort e 2 R+, exerted by
the division employee, results in the production of output V (e), gauged in terms of the
nal output of the rm, where V is a production function with the properties Ve > 0 and
Vee  0. It costs the employee a disutility C(e; ), where C is an e¤ort cost function, and
the parameter  is the employees privately known productivity level distributed on a nite
support

; 

according to a twice di¤erentiable common prior distribution F with the
probability density function f (f > 0) satisfying the non-decreasing monotone hazard rate
condition. The properties of the e¤ort cost function are Ce > 0; Cee > 0; Ce < 0; Cee < 0;
and Ce > 0. For the purpose of obtaining a closed-form equilibrium characterization,
we also assume that the e¤ort cost function C is separable in e¤ort e and productivity 
with its functional form C(e; ) = g(e)=, where g is a strictly convex twice di¤erentiable
function, which we use later in the analysis. If o¤ered a pay (or rating) r 2 [0; r] in return
for an e¤ort e, the employee of productivity  obtains a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
UA(r; e; ) = r   C(e; ); (1)
which needs to be at least non-negative for the employee to accept the o¤er (r; e).8 The
gross prot generated by the employee is V (e)   r, which the division manager and the
owner need to share.
The assumption is that the division manager knows the workings of his division (func-
tions C;UA; V ) and observes the employees e¤ort e, upon which he can condition his
reward (rating) r. The manager designs pay-for-e¤ort allocations for the employee to
choose from, which the manager does maximizing his own reward coming from the com-
pensation scheme o¤ered by the owner. To have the managers incentives aligned with
the prot maximization of the rm, the owner would like to make the managers compen-
sation proportional to the gross prot V (e)   r generated in his division. However, the
owner can do so only if she has as much information about the workings of the division
8To make the analysis simpler, we allow for a continuous rating (pay) scale.
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as the manager has. But with more divisions in the rm or, equivalently, in a larger rm
the owner has proportionally less time and resources per division needed to acquire full
information. Therefore, a compensation scheme, o¤ered the owner to the manager, is
bound to have ine¢ ciencies.
We model the owners problem in the following way (which is based on the manage-
ment by objectives paradigm and the evidence about the lack of managerial accountabil-
ity for payroll expense discussed above). The owner o¤ers the manager a compensation
scheme that directly rewards the manager for his accomplishments by granting a fraction
 2 (0; 1) of the output V , created in his division, but can make him internalize only an
 fraction of the payroll cost r, where  is a strictly decreasing function of the number
of divisions N in the rm dened by  : N ! [; 1], 0 <  < 1, with (1) = 1 and
limN!1 (N) = . (In other words, the function  is a measure of managerial account-
ability and a proxy of rm size: it takes lower values for larger rms and vice versa.)
The value (N), known by all the parties, is assumed to capture all the di¤erences in
information between the manager and the owner. A smaller value of  implies a larger
degree of asymmetric information, which translates into a softer budget constraint for the
manager (because managers can bargain for more advantageous compensation schemes).
Finally, to alleviate the problem of the managers having a soft budget constraint, the
owner can control the managers payroll budget by imposing an upper bound on it. In
our one-employee model, this constraint takes the form of an upper bound r on employee
rewards r.9
Given a compensation scheme (; r), the pay-for-e¤ort allocation (r; e) implemented
by the manager results in his von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
UM(r; e) = V (e)  r; (2)
9Imposing an upper bound on employee rewards comes naturally from the practice of job performance
appraisal performed on a nite rating scale, which, together with ratingsmonetary values, is set from
above. In the model, setting an upper bound is all that the owner does about designing employee
performance appraisal standards, other aspects of which are ignored for the sake of tractability. As an
extension to the model, one could also consider a case with many employees in a division, where the
owner, besides imposing an upper bound on rewards, can also constrain the total payroll budget available
to the manager. (In our model with a single employee, this constraint, of course, does not apply.)
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and the corresponding von Neumann-Morgenstern utility of the owner is equal to
(r; e) = (1  )V (e)  (1  )r; (3)
which is the output V less the employees payroll cost r and the managers compensation.
3.2 Nested Agency Problem
Suppose that every division of the rm functions as the following two-stage game between
the owner, manager, and employee, who are all rational expected utility maximizers.
Given the framework described above, in the rst stage the owner sets a compensation
scheme for the manager. In the second stage, after observing the compensation scheme
o¤ered by the owner, the manager designs a set of pay-for-e¤ort allocations for the em-
ployee to choose from. The employee chooses the allocation that maximizes his utility,
and after its implementation payo¤s to all the parties are realized.
To make the analysis more focused on the properties of employee wage schedules, we
assume that managersreward fraction  of output produced is exogenously determined
(e.g., by the outside labor market for managers) and is the same across all rms. Then,
the owners action concerning the managers compensation scheme is to set an upper
bound r 2 R+ on employee rewards. Then, by the revelation principle, without loss
of generality we can restrict the manager to design direct incentive-compatible pay-for-
e¤ort allocations fr(); e()g for every employee productivity type  2 ; , where the
reward and e¤ort allocations need to be non-decreasing functions r :

; 
 ! [0; r] and
e :

; 
 ! R+, respectively. The employee of productivity  announces a type ^ from
the type space

; 

, which leads to the implementation of the allocation (e(^); r(^)).
The resultant utility levels follow from (1) for the employee, from (2) for the manager,
and, respectively, from (3) for the owner.
Next, we solve the model by backward induction. Then, we discuss the properties of
the solution obtained with respect to the rm-size proxy . We show that for smaller
values of  the owner limits the managers discretion more by imposing a lower upper
13
bound on employee rewards. It eventually leads to the managers designing a atter
employee pay schedule with the ensuing compression of rewards (ratings) and rm-size
wage e¤ects of the type documented in the empirical literature.
3.2.1 The managers problem, Stage 2
The manager faces a hidden information problem since the employee productivity type 
is privately known. Given his own compensation scheme (; r), the manager maximizes
his expected utility with respect to pay-for-e¤ort allocations fr(); e()g2[;]
Z 

(V (e()  r())dF () (4)
subject to
r()  C(e(); )  0; (5)
r()  C(e(); )  r(^)  C(e(^); ); and (6)
0  r()  r; for all  and ^ in [; ]. (7)
The rst two constraints are the employees participation and incentive compatibility
constraints, respectively; and the last one is the upper-bound constraint imposed by the
owner in the rst stage.
The solution to the managers utility maximization problem without the upper-bound
constraint, eq. (4)(6), can be found by the well-established methods following Mirrlees
(1971). It is characterized by the functional equation
Ve(e())  [Ce(e(); )  1  F ()
f()
Ce(e(); )] = 0: (8)
Let the e¤ort function eu : [; ]! R+ solve the above equation; then, the corresponding
pay levels ru() are found from
ru() = C(eu(); ) 
Z 

C(e
u(~); ~)d~; for  2 [; ]: (9)
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The assumed non-decreasing monotone hazard rate condition ensures that the e¤ort
schedule eu() is increasing in productivity type  and the no distortion at the top
property holds. The solution to the reduced problem fru(); eu()g2[;] also constitutes
the solution to the full problem if the left-out constraint is not binding, i.e., if ru()  r.
If constraint (7) is binding, i.e., ru() > r for some , in order to solve the managers
problem we need to revise the solution method (see the Appendix for details). Then,
not surprisingly, as our solution to the full problem shows, the no distortion at the top
property is no longer preserved for the optimal pay-for-e¤ort allocations. In particular,
provided that the manager does not nd it optimal to exclude some of the least e¢ cient
employee types which is assumed to be the case throughout the paper, essentially as-
suming that the mass of ine¢ cient types is large enough we show that the manager
should o¤er a uniform pay-for-e¤ort allocation to some of the most e¢ cient types. Since
the manager cannot elicit the rst-best e¤ort level from the most e¢ cient type (from the
managers perspective) due to the pay cap imposed, he optimally reverts to an e¤ort level
that is lower than the rst-best one and makes it available to a pool of employee types.
With a reference to the Appendix for the details of solving full problem (4)-(7), its
solution fr(); e()g for  2 ;  is given in Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1 Let fru(); eu()g for  2 ;  be dened as in eq. (8) and (9). The
solution fr(); e()g2[;] to the managers problem (4)(7) is as follows
 if ru()  r, where r is the owners imposed upper bound reward, then fr(); e()g =
fru(); eu()g for every ;
 otherwise, for employee productivity types  in [; p) the optimal pay-for-e¤ort allo-
cations are fr(); e()g and for types  in [p; ]  fr; e(p)g, where the starting
point p of the pooling interval [p; ] and the e¤ort levels e() for  2 [; p] are
jointly determined by
1  F (p)
f(p)
=
[Ve(e
(p))  Ce(e(p); p)]Ce(e(p))
Ve(e(p))( Ce(e(p); p)) (10)
15
C(e(p); p) 
Z p

C(e
(); )d = r; (11)
and
[Ve(e
())  Ce(e(); )] + (1  F ())
f()
Ce(e
(); )+ (12)
+
(1  F (p)
f()
Ve(e
(p))  Ce(e(p); p)
Ce(e(p); p)
Ce(e
(); ) = 0:
The pay levels r() for  2 [; p) are equal to
r() = C(e(); ) 
Z 

C(e
(~); ~)d~: (13)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Before moving to the owners problem in stage 1, we make a few observations about
the optimal e¤ort schedule e characterized in Proposition 1. First, taking the limit
 ! p of (12) and then using (10) give us that lim!p e() = e(p), i.e., there is no
e¤ort discontinuity at p. In addition, given the di¤erentiability assumptions of functions
F;C; and V , the e¤ort schedule e() is di¤erentiable at every  with its derivative at p
dened as the limit from the left.
3.2.2 The owners problem, Stage 1
The owners expected residual prot resulting from the managers designed incentive
scheme fr; eg is equal to
fr;eg =
Z 

(r(); e())dF ()
=
Z 

(1  )V (e())  (1  )r()dF (): (14)
The owners problem is to maximize (14) when designing a compensation package for
her division manager, i.e., when imposing an upper bound r on employee rewards. Since
the rational owner can discern for herself the optimal employee incentive scheme fr; eg,
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designed by the manager in the second stage for a given upper bound r, the owners
expected prot can be expressed solely as a function of her action r. Also, we need to
consider only the case when  < 1, because with  = 1 the owners and the managers
optimization problems are identical and no explicit upper-bound constraint is required.
Denote the expected prot function by ~, which is a mapping of an upper bound
r 2 R+ into the prot fr;eg as in (14), where fr; eg is the optimal pay-for-e¤ort
allocation schedule from Proposition 1 for the given r. The function ~ is then dened by
~(r) =
Z ~p(r)

(1  )V (e())  (1  )r()dF ()+ (15)
+ (1  F (~p(r))[(1  )V (e(~p(r)))  (1  )r];
where ~p is the mapping of an upper bound r into the starting point p of the pooling
interval [p; ], as dened in Proposition 1.
We can restrict the domain of the function ~ to [0; ru()], where ru() is the highest
reward the manager would give if unconstrained in rewards (see eq. (8) and (9)), since
~(r) = ~(ru()) for any r  ru(). Next, consider the derivative of ~ at values of r such
that ~p(r) >  10
(1  F (~p(r))
h
(1  )Ve(e(~p(r)))e(~p(r))~pr(r)  (1  )
i
; (16)
where e(~
p(r)) is the derivative of the optimal e¤ort schedule at ~p(r) and ~pr(r) is the
derivative of the starting point of the pooling interval at r (both derivatives are dened
as the limits from the left). Di¤erentiating (11) in Proposition 1 with respect to r gives
e(~
p(r))~pr(r) =
1
Ce(e(~p(r)); ~p(r))
;
10For ease of exposition, we ignore the situations when the owner nds it optimal to impose such a
low upper bound r that the manager would pool all the types. Essentially, we assume that , the lowest
value  can possibly take, is high enough.
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and plugging it into (16) renders
(1  F (~p(r)))
"
(1  ) Ve(e
(~p(r)))
Ce(e(~p(r)); ~p(r))
  (1  )
#
: (17)
First, we observe that the derivative @~=@r, dened above, is equal to 0, when i) F (~p(r)) =
1, which happens when ~p(r) =  resultant from r = ru(), and ii) the expression in
the square brackets is equal to 0. For  < 1, r = ru() cannot be a maximizer of
the prot function ~ since the second-order condition does not hold.11 In case ii), we
note that for r close to ru() the ratio in the square brackets Ve=Ce approaches the
ratio Ve(eu())=Ce(eu(); ) = , which comes from the managers problem when uncon-
strained in rewards (see eq. (8)). But then, for r close enough to ru(), the expression in
the square brackets is negative (approximately equal to (1 )  (1 ) =  1 < 0),
and so is the derivative. By a similar token, for low enough values of r the expression
in the square brackets must be positive due to the concavity of V and convexity of C.
This implies that the derivative @~=@r changes its sign, which for simplicity we assume
that it does only once and there are no inection points when r < ru(). Hence, there
is a unique maximizer characterized by the point at which the expression in the square
brackets of (17) is equal to 0, or
Ve(e
(~p(r)))
Ce(e(~p(r)); ~p(r))
=
(1  )
(1  ) : (18)
Condition (18) has a natural interpretation. It requires setting an upper bound r so
that in the owners optimum it equates the owners marginal revenue (1 )Ve(e(~p(r)))
from the highest e¤ort level e(~p(r)) contracted by the manager with the marginal cost
of (1   )Ce(e(~p(r)); ~p(r)) that the owner bears. Moreover, when  < 1, the right-
hand side of (18) is greater than one, implying that it is not in the owners interest to
11The second-order condition is
@2~
@r2
(ru()) =  f()

(1  ) Ve(e
u())
Ce(eu(); )
  (1  )

=
=  f() [(1  )  (1  )] > 0;
since  < 1.
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have the rst-best (socially optimal) e¤ort level implemented (where the rst-best level
is determined from Ve(eFB()) = Ce(eFB(); )). All in all, if  < 1, the owner imposes a
binding upper-bound reward r in order to constrain the employee e¤orts elicited by the
manager (even below the socially optimal levels).
3.3 Equilibrium
Having established the conditions of the managers and the owners optimal play
Proposition 1 and eq. (18), respectively we can solve for the equilibrium of our nested
agency problem. In our derivations below, we make use of the assumption that the em-
ployees e¤ort cost function C(e; ) is separable in e¤ort and productivity, i.e., C(e; ) =
g(e)=, which, though, has no qualitative impact on the properties of the equilibrium
obtained.
Plugging (18) into (10) from Proposition 1 together with C(e; ) = g(e)= renders the
condition for the starting point p of the equilibrium pooling interval

p; 

:
1  F (p)
f(p)
= p
1  
1  ; (19)
with p > .12
Similarly, plugging (18) into (12) from Proposition 1 renders the condition for the
optimal e¤ort levels e() for productivity types  in [; p]:

Ve(e
())  ge(e
())


  ge(e
())
2
 (20)



(1  F ())
f()
+
(1  F (p)
f()
1  
1  

= 0:
The optimal pay schedule r() for  in [; p] is given by (13). Finally, the owner
12When discussing the maximization of the prot function ~, we excluded the situation when the
owner sets a very low upper bound r that would make the manager pool all the types by setting p = ,
which, otherwise, is perfectly feasible for low values of .
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determines the optimal upper bound r, ensuring condition (18) holds, from
r =
g(e(p))
p
+
Z p

g(e())
2
d: (21)
Proposition 2 below summarizes the above results and characterizes the equilibrium
of our agency problem.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium of the two-stage agency problem, dened by (4)-(7) and
(15), is the prole r and fr(); e()g2[;], where
 the managers optimal strategy fr; eg is dened by:
 for employee productivity types  in [; p), with p as in (19), the optimal
allocation is (r(); e()), where the optimal e¤ort and reward levels e()
and r() are dened by (20) and (13), respectively;
 for productivity types  in

p; 

, the optimal allocation is (r; e(p)), where
the e¤ort e(p) and reward r are found from (20) and (21), respectively;
 the owners optimal strategy r is dened by (21);
4 Equilibrium properties
Below, we discuss the properties of the equilibrium obtained in their relationship to rm-
size proxy  (or managerial accountability measure).
4.1 Pooling at the top
As it follows from Proposition 2 and the derivations preceding it, for the values of 
less than 1, the incentive scheme o¤ered by the manager features a uniform pay-for-
e¤ort allocation for employee types  from the non-empty interval [p; ] (if  < 1, then
p <  from (19)). The underlying reason for the existence of the pooling equilibrium
is the misalignment of the owners and the managers interests. When the manager
is not fully accountable for the payroll costs incurred, the owner, who then bears a
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disproportionately larger share of costs, attempts to limit the managers discretion by
imposing a binding upper bound on employee rewards. Consequently, in response to the
upper bound constraint imposed the manager optimally pools employee types and makes
them subject to the highest available reward.
Moreover, the lower the value  takes, the more the pooling-equilibrium interval
extends. As it follows from (19), the internal derivative dp=d is positive:
dp
d
=  
p

1 
(1 )2

d
dp

1 F (p)
f(p)

    1 
1 
 > 0; (22)
where in the denominator the derivative of the inverse hazard rate is negative (due to the
assumption).
Proposition 3 summarizes the above ndings.
Proposition 3 With  < 1, the employee types  in [p; ], where p <  due to (19),
are subject to the uniform pay-for-e¤ort allocation (r; e(p)), dened in Proposition 2.
The length of the pooling-equilibrium interval [p; ] decreases in .
With this result in mind, later we argue that a lenient job performance appraisal
practice with the ensuing compression of ratings, frequently observed in practice, can be
an equilibrium outcome.
4.2 Wage dispersion
In this subsection, we argue that in equilibrium the range of rewards [r(); r] increases
in , i.e., there is a higher wage dispersion in smaller rms. A su¢ cient condition for
this result to exist is that the internal derivatives of the highest and lowest e¤ort lev-
els contracted in equilibrium, de(p)=d and de()=d, are, respectively, positive and
negative.
The owners optimality condition (18) shows that with  decreasing (which makes the
right-hand side of (18) increase), the owner wants the highest e¤ort level e(p) contracted
by the manager to be lower. Formally, the internal derivative de(p)=d of (18), with
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the cost function C(e; ) replaced by g()= (which, though, has no e¤ect on the result),
is positive:
de(p)
d
=   ge(e
(p))=p
(1  )Vee(e(p)  (1  )gee(e(p))=p > 0:
Therefore, when  is small, in order to attain a lower e¤ort level e(p) in equilibrium, the
owner has to impose a lower upper bound on employee rewards, implying that dr=d is
positive. To put it in words, the more unaccountable managers are, the more the owner
constrains their discretion about employee compensation.
Next, we provide conditions for de()=d to be negative. Taking the internal deriv-
ative de()=d of (20) we obtain at  = 
de()
d
=  
  ge
2
h
 + 1
f()
  1 F (p)
f()(1 ) +
d(1 F (p))
d
1 
f()(1 )
i
Vee   gee   gee2
h
 1
f()
+ (1 F (
p)
f()
1 
1 
i = (23)
=  
  ge
2
h
 + 1
f()
  1 F (p)
f()(1 )   (1 F (
p))
f()(1 )
i
Vee   gee   gee2
h
 1
f()
+ (1 F (
p)
f()
1 
1 
i (24)
where the arguments of functions V and g are dropped for more clarity, and to obtain
the di¤erential d(1   F (p))=d we use identity (19). Since Vee  0 and gee > 0, the
denominator of the above expression is negative. The numerator is also negative if the
expression in the square brackets is positive, which, however, is dependent on parameter
values. To have this expression positive, we provide the following conditions: the em-
ployee is cost-e¢ cient enough, i.e., the lowest-bound productivity  takes a large enough
value and/or the managers share of output, the parameter , is not too large. If these
conditions are met, then de()=d is negative, implying that dr()=d < 0 (as follows
from (13)). Since the optimal e¤ort and reward allocations are continuous in type , the
dispersion of rewards increases in .
Intuitively, this equilibrium property stipulates that with less accountable managers
in the rm the owner tries to limit their payroll expense by lowering an upper bound
on employee rewards. It eventually makes reward-constrained managers distort the in-
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centives of most e¢ cient employee types even further by attempting to elicit more e¤ort
from less able types.
Proposition 4 below summarizes the equilibrium property discussed, which is also
illustrated by the numerical example in the next subsection (see Diagram (b) of Figure
1).
Proposition 4 The highest available employee reward r and lowest contracted reward
r(), dened in Proposition 2, are, respectively, increasing and decreasing in  if the
employee is cost e¢ cient enough and the managers share of output  is not too large
(to ensure de()=d < 0 in (23)). Then, due to the continuity of the equilibrium reward
schedule r, the range of equilibrium rewards [r(); r] increases in .
4.3 Wage premium
Here, we show how a large-rm wage premium can arise in our model. What we need to
demonstrate is that for a given distribution for productivity types the expected employee
wage increases in rm size or, in our model, decreases in . For a given value of , let r
denote the expected equilibrium employee wage characterized in Proposition 2:
r =
Z 

r()f()d;
and let V  denote the expected equilibrium output:
V  =
Z 

V (e())f()d:
As we are going to see, the relationship between expected wage r and rm-size proxy 
is not monotonous over the whole range of values of . However, for the range of  where
the expected output V  decreases in  the expected employee wage will also decrease in ,
but the prot of the rm will not. In other words, we show that higher productivity levels
together with higher average wages, empirically observed in larger rms (see Idson & Oi
(1999)), can also stem from the (partially) unaccountable managerial practice. Besides
the direct evidence on managerial unaccountability, our results are also reinforced with
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the empirical evidence on smaller rmsbeing more protable (Banz (1981), Fama &
French (1992)).
Before giving an analytical argument for the large-rm wage premium, we illustrate it
together with the previous results with a numerical example for the following specication
of the model. The production function V is linear in e¤ort, V (e) = e; the e¤ort cost
function takes the form of C(e; ) = e2=(2); the employee types are uniformly distributed
on type space [5; 10], i.e.,  = 5;  = 10; the managers output share  = 0:15; and
the rm-size proxy  takes values from [0:5; 1]. For this specication, we calculate the
equilibrium results of Proposition 2, which are illustrated in Figure 1. Diagrams (a),
(b), and (c) plot for di¤erent values of  employeesexpected e¤ort and wage, and the
expected prot of the rm; employeeswage dispersion; and pooling-equilibrium starting
point p, respectively.
Diagram (a) of Figure 1 shows that the expected equilibrium employee wage is not
a monotonous function of . We observe a large-rm wage premium over the interval
[0:814; 1], i.e., where the expected employee wage declines in ; see the dashed line. (The
observation that r does not decline monotonically in  is not surprising: with very
unaccountable managers, i.e., for low values of  managerial discretion over wages, signif-
icantly suppressed by the owner, allows managers to o¤er only low wages, correspondingly
resulting in low average wage.) As we can also see from the diagram, the expected em-
ployee output follows the same dynamics as the expected wage: at the interval, where the
large-rm wage premium is observed, V  also decreases in  (see the dashdot line). At the
same time, the expected prot of a rm monotonically increases in  (see the dotted line;
this outcome naturally follows from the model: the less accountable the managers are,
the lower the prot a rm has, everything else equal). To put it in words, the expected
prot and payroll expense of a small rm can be respectively higher and lower than those
of a larger rm (matching the empirical evidence of rm-size e¤ects on average wages
and prots). The reason for this, as we argue, is managerslower degree of accountability
in larger rms, which results in higher employee payroll expenses and, correspondingly,
higher e¤ort levels, exerted beyond the prot-maximizing levels of the rm, leading to
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prot losses.
Formally, we state and prove the following proposition on the incidence of the wage
premium, which implications we discuss in the next section.
Proposition 5 If the expected output per employee, characterized in Proposition 2, in-
creases in rm size, then the expected wage also increases in rm size, but the expected
prot decreases.
Proof. Consider two rms, rm 1 and rm 2, with distinct managerial accountability
levels 1 and 2, respectively, where 1 > 2 (i.e., rm 1 is smaller in size than rm 2).
Let the output produced in rm 2 is greater than that in rm 1: V 1 < V 2 . Contrary
to what we need to prove, suppose that the prot of rm 2 is greater than or equal to
that of rm 1. Applying our denition of prot (14), we have
(1  )V 2   (1  2)r2  (1  )V 1   (1  1)r1 :
Since 1 > 2, we can write
(1  )V 2   (1  1)r2 > (1  )V 1   (1  1)r1 :
Diving by (1  ) and rearranging the above expression yield
V 2   V 1 > (1  1)
(1  )
 
r2   r1 : (25)
At the same time, since the manager of rm 1 chooses the contract that elicits the
expected e¤ort V 1 and payroll expense r1 rather than V 2 and r2 (which are also
feasible for the manager of rm 1 due to a higher pay cap) it must be that
V 1   1r1  V 2   1r2 :
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Rearranging this inequality yields
V 2   V 1  1
 
r2   r1 : (26)
Since 1 < (1   1)=(1   ), inequalities (25) and (26) cannot simultaneously hold.
Hence, it must be that the expected prot of rm 1 is greater than that of rm 2.
Finally, since V 2   V 1 > 0, we also have from (26) that r2 > r1.
5 Discussion
In the introduction, we raised the empirical stylized facts of the compression of rat-
ings (rewards) and of the rm-size wage e¤ects. Below, we relate these facts with our
theoretical results obtained. In addition, drawing on our ndings, we provide di¤erent
interpretations of some empirical evidence presented in the related literature.
5.1 Compression of ratings
It has been long observed that variation in rewards (ratings) is smaller than variation in
the actual performance for which the rewards have been granted, see Murphy & Cleveland
(1995). Relating this observation to our model, we argue that the compression of ratings
can, in fact, be an outcome of managersoptimal performance evaluation strategy. If
constrained in employee rewards, which he is only partially accountable for, a manager
nds it optimal to extract more e¤ort from low-productivity employee types even at
the expense of distorting the incentives of high-productivity employee types. Given the
results in Propositions 2 and 3, the manager di¤erentiates only among those e¤ort levels
that are within the range [e(); e(p)], and the length of this e¤ort range decreases with
rm size. So if an employee for one or another reason exerts an e¤ort level above e(p)
the manager would still give her the same reward of r granted for the e¤ort level of
e(p).
Akerlof (1982) provides a specic example, where the incentives in place for cash
posters at the Eastern Utilities Co. seemed to be suboptimal either from the employees
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or the employers perspective. In this example, employees were paid the same wage
provided they recorded at least 300 postings per hour, and no bonuses or promotion
promises were given for exceeding the limit. Some cash posters, however, did exceed the
limit, but still were paid the same wage. It raised the question of why those overworking
cash posters did not reduce their e¤ort levels, or, on the other hand, why the employer
did not provide additional incentives for them to extract even more e¤ort.
In addition to the gift-exchangeexplanation by Akerlof (1982), our model can give
another insight into the agency problem described. The xed pay o¤ered for at least
300 recorded postings could, in fact, constitute an optimal employee incentive scheme,
where optimal,from the managers perspective, is to maximize the number of postings
recorded. Technically, in our model, for low enough values of  the pooling equilibrium
may stretch out to comprise the whole employee type space. To put it in words, if the
manager is not held very accountable for the payroll expense he incurs, to set a uniform
incentive scheme, just meeting the participation constraint of low-productivity employees,
can be optimal for the manager. However, why all the cash posters would not simply
meet the prescribed limit is a question beyond what our model can explain.
5.2 Firm-size e¤ects
The rm-size wage e¤ects take the form of a higher average wage and lower wage disper-
sion in larger rms (see Oi & Idson (1999); Garen (1985); Brown &Medo¤(1989)). Given
our assumption that a larger size means a larger asymmetry in information between the
owner and managers, our model shows that the empirical regularities observed in practice
can constitute equilibrium outcomes as well.
With regard to wage dispersion, we argue that the smaller a rm is (or the more
accountable its managers are), the more e¢ cient economic incentives for employees are
put in place, and vice versa, which accordingly leads to the inverse relationship between
wage dispersion and rm size (see Proposition 4). The reason for this result is that
managerssoft budget constraint is more of a problem in a larger rm, prompting the
owner to curb managersdiscretion over employee pay to avoid excessive payroll expense.
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Managers respond to that, as discussed in the preceding subsection, by setting coarser
reward schemes leading to a shallower di¤erentiation of good from bad performance levels.
This result has strong empirical support. Stigler (1962, Table 5) reports wage dispersion
to vary inversely with rm size; Garen (1985) and Evans & Leighton (1989) report returns
to employee productivity and skills (experience) to be higher in smaller rms.
As for the large-rm wage premium, our model also o¤ers a di¤erent view of this
phenomenon. In Proposition 5, we argue that it can be an equilibrium outcome of the
agency problem studied here: the average wage increases in rm size. A higher average
wage comes from a higher average e¤ort exerted, which empirically can be interpreted
that workers are more productive in larger rms and that is why they get paid more
(as argued in Idson & Oi (1999)). But as our model shows, it may not necessarily
be always the case. In larger rms, for the reasons explained before, managers design
employee incentive schemes that elicit more e¤ort from low-productivity employees (whose
incentives, in the symmetric information case, would be distorted to elicit more e¤ort
from high-productivity employees). As a result, one can observe that employees in larger
rms exert on average more e¤ort, which, however, does not mean that they are more
productive per se. It could be the incentive schemes o¤ered by their managers that make
them exert more e¤ort on average, but this may not be in the best interest of the rm.
In fact, our argument is reinforced by the empirical ndings from nancial studies
about smaller rms having higher stock returns and, arguably, higher levels of protability
(see Banz (1981); Fama & French (1992)). Hence, if workers in smaller rms are less
productive, then how does this match with the fact that smaller rms have higher levels
of protability? However, in our model, we do obtain that small rms are more protable
despite lower average output produced (Proposition 5). The owner of a smaller rm can
more accurately align her managerscompensation scheme with the prot maximization
of the rm.
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6 Concluding remarks
Based on the observation that managers have a soft budget constraint when evaluating
their employeesperformance, in this paper we argue that the documented empirical reg-
ularities of the compression of ratings and rm-size e¤ects can be equilibrium outcomes.
With the idea that managerial incentives cannot be perfectly aligned with the prot
maximization of the rm, the owner attempts to restrain her managerspayroll expense
by capping employee rewards. This, subsequently, leads to managers designing atter
pay-for-e¤ort allocation schedules for their employees, which, we argue, is behind the
compression of ratings phenomenon. Assuming that in smaller rms managers are held
more accountable for their actions as empirical evidence indicates to be the case the
model makes predictions that are in line with the empirical evidence from the industrial
psychology, labor, and nance strands of literature on rm-size e¤ects. All in all, we
argue that manager accountability can be an important factor behind the systematic
di¤erences observed in employee wage schedules.
This paper can also contribute to the debate on the best corporate policy. We o¤er
an argument why small size is good for a rm: a larger rm size can be confounded with
the problem of lower managerial accountability resulting in higher payroll expense and
less e¢ cient employee incentive schemes. In case excessive payroll expense is an issue in
a rm, then predicting that the lack of managerial accountability is behind it a policy
recommendation would be to subdivide the rm into separate units, prot centers, with
distinct organization and accounting departments. The segregation of a rm into prot
centers would give top executives additional gauges to align the incentives of a prot
centers managers more closely with the overall prot maximization of the rm.13 Then,
according to our model, managerial compensation schemes that are more in line with the
rm prot maximization would result in payroll expense reductions.
Finally, the model presented here can be more generally described as a hidden-
information agency problem with asymmetric transfer values (since a rating, issued by
the manager, costs the manager less than it is worth to the employee). One can think of
13For other advantages of the establishment of prot centers, see Frey & Osterloh (2002).
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other real-life situations where a similar model could be applicable. Take, for instance,
a public procurement problem. The procurement agency may not always have strong
incentives to save on the costs of procuring a particular service as long as the budgetary
limits imposed by the legislative body are met. Since little credit is received for any cost
savings, which simply submerge in the state or municipal budget, the procurement agency
may instead focus more on the quality side of the service procured, for which it would get
direct dividends in terms of a greater public approval. Hence, we face an agency problem
similar to the one between the manager and employee discussed above: the procurement
agency and the contractor can have di¤erent valuations of transfers between them.
Appendix. Proof of Proposition 1
Here, we solve the managers problem, (4)(7), with upper-bound constraint (7) binding.
To illustrate better the argument behind the solution, we approach the problem through
its discrete version, and then take the limit of the results obtained to arrive at the solution
with the continuous employee type space.
Discretization
We partition the employee type space

; 

into n equal subintervals [i; i + @],
where i =  + (i   1)@, for i = 1; :::; n, and @ = (   )=n. Then, we discretize
the initial (continuous) distribution F for employee types by dening probability weights
p(i) =
R i+@
i
f()d for every i, which is the probability mass of the employee types
within the interval [i; i+@]. (From this discretization, we later switch to the continuous
case by taking the limit n!1; or @ ! 0.)
The discrete version of the managers optimization problem eq. (4)(7) is as follows.
With respect to pay-for-e¤ort allocations fr(i); e(i)gi=1;:::;n the manager maximizes his
expected utility
nX
i=1
p(i)[V (e(i))  r(i)]
subject to
r(i)  C(e(i); i)  0; (Pi)
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r(i)  C(e(i); i)  r(j)  C(e(j); i); (ICi)
0  r(i)  r; for every i = 1; :::; n and j 6= i. (27)
Setting up the Lagrangean
As it is standard, rst, we reduce the problem above by singling out the constraints
that need to be binding in the optimum. Let a pay-for-e¤ort schedule of allocations
fr(i); e(i)gi=1;:::;n be the solution to the managers problem. For fr; eg to be the
solution, we must have that the e¤ort and pay schedules e and r are monotonically
increasing in  (it follows from incentive compatibility) and r(n) = r (it follows from
the binding upper-bound constraint and the monotonicity). Next, we make the following
(strict monotonicity) conjecture.
Conjecture 1 For any partition of the employee type space, the solution to the managers
problem fr; eg consists of pay-for-e¤ort allocations distinct for every employee type.
Essentially, we conjecture that only the most e¢ cient type n obtains the highest
reward of r, which later we need to check if it is valid.
In the optimum, the adjacent IC constraints need to be downward binding:
r(i)  C(e(i); i) = r(i 1)  C(e(i 1); i); i = 2; :::; n: (28)
The only binding participation constraint is that of the least e¢ cient agent type from
those contracted upon. We impose it to be P1, i.e.,
r(1)  C(e(1); 1) = 0;
assuming that in the population there is a large enough mass of ine¢ cient employee types.
Finally, if the above binding constraints and the monotonicity constraint hold, then due
to the Spence-Mirrlees property the rest of constraints also hold.
As it follows from the constraints in (28) and the binding participation constraint, in
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the optimum it has to be that for the pay levels r(i), i = 2; :::; n, we have
r(i) =
Xi
j=1
C(e(j); j) 
Xi
j=2
C(e(j 1); j); (29)
which are used to eliminate the pay allocations r from the maximization problem. Ac-
cordingly, at the top of the type space it has to be that
r  
nX
i=1
C(e(i); i) +
nX
i=2
C(e(i 1); i) = 0; (30)
which, in what follows, characterizes the upper-bound constraint (27).
Next, we set the Lagrangean of the reduced optimization problem, which is
L(fe(i)gni=1; ) = p(1)[V (e(1))  C(e(1); 1)]+
+
n 1X
i=2
p(i)[V (e(i))  (
Xi
j=1
C(e(j); j) 
Xi
j=2
C(e(j 1); j))]+
+ p(n)[V (e(n))  r] + (r  
nX
i=1
C(e(i); i) +
nX
i=2
C(e(i 1); i));
where  is the Lagrange multiplier of upper-bound constraint (30). (Other constraints
enter the Lagrangean through r(i) replaced by (29).)
The rst-order conditions with respect to the e¤ort levels e(i) for i = 1; :::; n  1
are
p(i)[Ve(e(i))  Ce(e(i); i)]  [
Xn 1
j=i+1
p(j) + ] (31)
(Ce(e(i); i)  Ce(e(i); i+1)) = 0;
and with respect to e(n) it is
p (n)Ve(e(n))  Ce(e(n); n) = 0: (32)
Solving these n rst-order conditions together with constraint (30) give us the optimal
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e¤ort levels e(i), i = 1; :::; n, with the corresponding pay levels r(i) following from
P1 and (29). If at the limit n ! 1, the pay-for-e¤ort allocations obtained are distinct
for every employee type with the e¤ort schedule monotonically increasing, then it is the
solution to the managers problem (4)(7).
But, as is shown below, for ne partitions of the employee type space the perfect
screening of employee types cannot be optimal. The manager can do better by pooling
some of the most e¢ cient types.
Pooling at the top
Let ~e(i), i = 1; :::; n, solve the above rst-order conditions. It must be that the e¤ort
level ~e(n) aimed at the most e¢ cient employee type is less than the rst-best e¤ort level
dened as efb(n) = fe(n) : Ve(e(n))  Ce(e(n); n) = 0g.14 It results in the e¢ ciency
loss of Ve(~e(n))  Ce(~e(n); n) > 0 and implies  > p(n).
Next, through the Lagrange multiplier  we combine the adjacent rst-order condi-
tions for ~e(n) and ~e(n 1) to get
p(n)
p(n 1)
=
[Ve(~e(n 1))  Ce(~e(n 1); n 1)]C(~e(n))
V (~e(n))[Ce(~e(n 1); n 1)  Ce(~e(n 1); n)] : (33)
Multiplying both sides by @ and taking the limit @ ! 0, which is equivalent to taking
the limit n ! 1, render that the left-hand side of the above expression tends to zero
(since the limit lim
n!1
p(n)=p(n 1) = 1). At the same time, the limit of the right-hand
side is equal to
[Ve(~e())  Ce(~e(); )]Ce(~e())
Ve(~e())( Ce(~e(); ))
;
which remains strictly positive because of Ve(~e())  Ce(~e(); ) > 0.
Hence, for the continuum of employee types (or ne enough partitions of the employee
type space) the derived optimality (rst-order) conditions cannot support the distinct
pay-for-e¤ort allocations conjectured Conjecture 1 does not hold at the limit. For ne
14To see this, if ~e(n) = efb(n), then the Lagrange multiplier is  = p(n), from which it follows
that the e¤ort levels ~e(i) for all i are identical to the optimal e¤ort levels from the problem without the
upper-bound constraint, i.e., eu(i) from (8). But since the upper bound constraint is binding, the e¤ort
levels ~e(i) cannot be implemented in the incentive compatible way (provided, of course, the manager
does not exclude any low types, which is ruled out).
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enough type space partitions, to meet the optimality conditions the manager has to pool
some of the most e¢ cient employee types by making them subject to the highest reward
of r.
Then, we continue with gradually increasing the probability mass of employee types
subject to the highest reward and denote this mass by P (m) =
Pn
j=m p(j), where
m = n   1; n   2; :::. We repeat the above solution algorithm for di¤erent m (with m
replacing n in the above derivations) until we have the optimality conditions met. In
particular, for a given m, the rst-order condition equivalent to (32) is:
P (m)Ve(e(m))  Ce(e(m); m) = 0; (34)
while the rest of the rst-order conditions for i = 1; :::;m  1 remain intact.
The equivalent expression to (33) is
P (m)
p(m 1)
=
[Ve(e(m 1))  Ce(e(m 1); m 1)]C(e(m))
V (e(m))[Ce(e(m 1); m 1)  Ce(e(m 1); m)] : (35)
Multiplying both sides by @ and taking the limit @ ! 0 on both sides render the
optimal pooling condition:
1  F (p)
f(p)
=
[Ve(e(
p))  Ce(e(p); p)]Ce(e(p))
Ve(e(p))( Ce(e(p); p)) ; (36)
where p is the employee type for which the above optimality condition holds (which
is exactly (10) in Proposition 1). The productivity type p is the starting point of the
pooling interval [p; ], for which the uniform allocation (e(p); r) applies. The e¤ort level
e(p) is pinned down by the remaining optimality conditions as dened below.
The optimal allocations fe(); r()g2[;]
Having established the pooling condition (36) and reverting to the continuous case
henceforth, from (34) the Lagrange multiplier is equal to
 = (1  F (p)) aVe(e(
p))
Ce(e(p); p)
:
34
Plugging it into the remaining rst-order conditions (31) and taking the continuous ver-
sion of them render for any   p
[Ve(e())  Ce(e(); )] + (1  F ())
f()
Ce(e(); )+ (37)
+
(1  F (p)
f()
Ve(e(
p))  Ce(e(p); p)
Ce(e(p); p)
Ce(e(); ) = 0;
which is (12) in Proposition 1. Finally, the last condition that needs to be met is constraint
(30), the continuous version of which is
r = C(e(p); p) 
Z p

C(e(); )d; (38)
which is (11) in Proposition 1.
All in all, conditions (36)(38) together determine the optimal e¤ort levels e() for
all  in [; ]. Given the modeling assumptions imposed, one can easily verify the second-
order condition of (37) is met and that the monotonicity constraint for e to be increasing
that has been omitted holds. Finally, the optimal pay levels r() for  in [; p) follow
from the continuous version of (29), which is (13) in Proposition 1.
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Figure 1: a) Expected output, wage, and profit
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